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CHANGING THE NARRATIVE: CONVINCING COURTS
TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MISBEHAVIOR AND
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN SCHOOL REFERRAL CASES
Marsha L. Levick and Robert G. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1990s, when public schools introduced "zero tolerance" policies
in response to real and perceived threats of violence, teachers and administrators
have increasingly turned to the courts to address school-based misconduct.1 In
opting to refer all - or most - misconduct to law enforcement, school officials
captured not only students with guns or knives, but elementary and middle school
children whose misbehavior in prior decades would have been dealt with by their
teachers or school disciplinarian. 2 In response, children's lawyers turned their attention to schools, urging them to distinguish between students whose misbehav* Marsha L. Levick, J.D., is the Legal Director of Juvenile Law Center; Robert G. Schwartz,
J.D., is the Executive Director of Juvenile Law Center. The authors thank Suzanne Meiners, J.D.,
Juvenile Law Center's Sol and Helen Zubrow Fellow in Children's Law (2002-2004); Vincent Herman, J.D., Sol and Helen Zubrow Fellow in Children's Law (2004-2006); and Riya Shah, Sol and
Helen Zubrow Fellow in Children's Law (2005-2007) for their contributions to this article.
1 See, e.g., Judith A. Browne, Advancement Project, Derailed! The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse
Track 14 (2003) (demonstrating that Miami Dade County Public School System arrests have tripled
since 1999); Building Blocks for Youth, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of "Zero Tolerance"
and Other Exclusionary Policies on Kentucky Students 26 (2003) (forum of juvenile court judges and
staff noting "referrals by schools to juvenile court of misconduct appear to be on the increase.");
Advancement Project, Harvard Univ., The Civil Rights Project, OpportunitiesSuspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline Policies 15 (2000) ("Vast numbers of
children are caught up in the juvenile justice system for typical adolescent behavior . . . referrals of
schoolchildren to law enforcement agencies often occur in the absence of violence. Data from South
Carolina indicates that even those students accused of 'Disturbing Schools' are referred to law enforcement agencies. During the 1998-99 school year, more than 3,000 students were referred to law
enforcement for this reason."); Tim Grant, Back to School: Zero tolerance makes discipline more
severe, involves the courts, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 2006 (noting that schools adopt
zero-tolerance policies to allow administrators to impose serious penalties for even minor violations
to reinforce the overall importance of following the rules).
2 See, e.g., Zero Sense, Editorial, Times-Picayune, Dec. 15, 2004, at 6 (reporting a ten-year-old
child was arrested and taken from the school by police when school officials found scissors in her
backpack); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 11
(2000) ("In Indianola, Mississippi, elementary school students have been arrested and taken to the
local jail for talking during an assembly."); BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF "ZERO TOLERANCE" AND OTHER EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES ON KENTUCKY

STUDENTS 7 (2003) ("An 11-year-old from Columbia, South Carolina was arrested and suspended for
having a steak knife in her lunchbox to cut chicken she brought to school to eat.").
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ior was normative or, in the case of students with disabilities, expected.3 These
efforts proved unavailing.
While children's lawyers and other advocates should continue to advocate for

changes in the behavior of school officials, defense counsel in juvenile court must
also change the way they represent students charged with school-based delin-

quent acts. Defense attorneys should draw on their understanding of the role and
powers of juvenile court judges, take advantage of traditional defenses related to

criminal intent and capacity, and must, in appropriate cases involving students
with disabilities, demonstrate to judges that students' misbehavior is better addressed in the school house than in the court house.
A decade ago, instead of raising defenses in juvenile court, children's lawyers
tried to address inappropriate referrals of special education students to juvenile
court by suing to change the behavior of schools. 4 In particular, advocates for
children with disabilities challenged the right of school districts to refer special
education students to juvenile court. The theory, exemplified best by Morgan v.
Chris L.,5 was that there were circumstances in which school officials violated the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)6 by having students arrested
and referred to court, rather than implementing a behavior management plan and

providing an appropriate education.
The Sixth Circuit in Chris L. agreed with that argument. Congress countered
at the end of the decade by amending IDEA to expressly permit such referrals,

saying:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prohibit an agency from
reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability to appropriate authorities or to prevent State law enforcement and judicial authorities from

exercising their responsibilities with regard to the application of Federal
7
and State law to crimes committed by a child with a disability.

3 See, e.g., Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2448 (1997), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (k)(6), as recognized
in Joseph M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., No. 99-4645, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2994 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
19, 2001); Commonwealth v. Nathaniel M., 764 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Edward J. Sarzynski, Disciplininga Handicapped Student, 46 WEST ED. L. RPTR. 17, 18-21 (1988); Joseph B. Tulman,
Disabilityand Delinquency:How Failuresto Identify, Accommodate, and Serve Youth With EducationRelated Disabilities Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation In the Delinquency System, 3
WHIT-IER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 5-8 (2003).
4 Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2448 (1997), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (k)(6), as recognized in
Joseph M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., No. 99-4645, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2994 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19,
2001).
5 Id.
6 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419.
7 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A) ("Referral to and Action by Law Enforcement and Judicial
Authorities").
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Chris L.-type actions sought to alter what schools do. Such efforts are increasingly difficult. 8 This article shifts the spotlight from schools to juvenile courts,
particularly by examining the role of the juvenile court judge in responding to
these referrals, and the role of the defense attorney in representing these youth in
juvenile court.
The juvenile court has always been flexible in deciding which cases warrant
formal action by the juvenile justice system, and which cases can be diverted or
treated informally.9 Indeed, "discretionarydecision making is a core part of how
the juvenile justice system operates."' 10 Juvenile court judges can use their discretion to ameliorate harm from inappropriate referrals in cases of special education
and general education students. They can also reduce or drop charges by requiring that there be proof of the elements of the crimes with which students are
charged.
Judicial responses to school cases - which can make inappropriate referrals
harder on schools and easier on children - fall into three categories. They apply
to basic education and special education students. We will address all three in this
article.
The first response to school-based referrals involves the role of the juvenile
court as gatekeeper. When the court adopts this role, the juvenile court may take
two possible approaches to closing the gate or making it more difficult to breach.
First, the juvenile court may exercise its inherent discretion to divert cases of
children who do not belong in juvenile court. This is a diversion function, which
can happen any time in case processing and applies to general education as well
as special education students.1 1 This approach is consistent with the traditional
operation of the juvenile court.
An alternative gate-keeping opportunity will involve stretching the court's
traditional role. In this approach, the juvenile court will effectively make new
law, creating a "manifestation" defense that the court will apply to the facts of
the case.1 2
8 See Dominga Soliz & Noah Cutler, Note, Disabled Youth, Incarceration, and Educational
Challenges, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 265 (2001); Terry Jean Seligmann, Not As Simple As
ABC: Disciplining Children With Disabilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 ARIZ. L. REV.
77, 80 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to
Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 11, 14 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
10 BARRY KRISBERG, JUVENILE JUSTICE: REDEEMING OUR CHILDREN 80 (2005).
11

See generally ZERO TOLERANCE: RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS

(William Ayers et al. eds., 2001).
12 The "manifestation defense" does not currently exist in criminal law. Rather, we take the
term as it is used in the special education context, as, for example, in 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.523-524 (2001)
("Manifestation determination review"), and adapt it to traditional criminal law defenses or
mitigators.
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A court that accepts a manifestation defense will, at some point in the process,
dismiss the charges when it finds that (a) the behavior that led to arrest is a
manifestation of a youth's disability, and (b) dismissal is appropriate under the
circumstances of the case. Those circumstances involve (1) the harm done by the
youth, and (2) the methods available to the school or court to manage the risk
that the youth poses. The court will dismiss charges when it determines, given the
risks involved, that the school is a more appropriate manager of risk than the
court.
Defense attorneys who promote the manifestation defense must transform the
narrative of the case. Defense counsel must present evidence that this case is
more about who the student is than what the student has done.
The second way that the juvenile court can respond to school-based referrals is
by closely examining the charges. The court can either dismiss the charges or, in
the course of entering a judgment, find the youth guilty of a lesser charge than the
school or prosecutor seeks. This will reduce the harm of prosecution. This is less
discretionary, but as discussed below, courts have great leeway in fact-finding and
interpreting the law.
The third response available to the court under current law is to avoid unnecessary placement. To achieve this goal, the court must be confident that youths
will be educated if he or she enters a community-based disposition. Some juvenile
court judges have found ways, using their state laws, to order schools to receive
students.

I.

DIVERSION OF INAPPROPRIATE REFERRALS IS A TRADITIONAL USE OF
JUVENILE COURT DISCRETION THAT SHOULD BE INVOKED BY
BOTH ADVOCATES AND JUDGES

A.

Juvenile Court Judges Have Inherent Power to Divert Cases

As noted above, juvenile court judges possess discretionary authority to divert
cases under appropriate circumstances. Lawyers for children should be taking
advantage of this inherent authority. A significant number of referrals from
schools can be deflected from juvenile court at the front gate.
More than a decade ago, Barry Feld articulated the natural tension in juvenile
court. 13 He described a tug of war between social control and social welfare,
which creates a Manichean mission for the system. For Feld, the contradictions
warrant abandoning the juvenile court. We suggest that those very contradictions
present opportunities to oppose many school-based juvenile court prosecutions.
Feld's fundamental tension has existed since the beginning of the juvenile court.
13 Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)justice and the Criminal Court Alternative, 39 CRIME & DELINQ.
403 (1993).
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torn, one scholar writes, "between a fear for children and a
Americans have been
14

fear of children."

Thomas Bernard has documented this cycle, noting that Americans sometimes
perceive the juvenile justice system as too harsh, sometimes as too lenient. These
perceptions have led to a sine curve of policy shifts aimed at correcting the system's apparent shortcomings. 15 But the cycles of juvenile justice are not inevitable. It requires human energy to turn the wheel. In the case of barring the
courthouse door to inappropriate referrals from the schoolhouse, that energy will
come from defense lawyers and the juvenile court judges they persuade.
Fortunately, from its inception, the juvenile court itself has been hospitable to
the notion that it can avoid unnecessarily punishing youth for normative adolescent misbehavior. This tolerance for certain types of adolescent behavior is best
exemplified by the notion of diversion. This concept has always been at the heart
of the juvenile court's social welfare role. It has taken two forms.
First, as Franklin Zimring has observed, the juvenile court was created to divert youth "from the rigors of criminal punishment.",16 Diversion in this sense
was primarily from adult criminal court. The more that today's juvenile court
relies on adult-like punishments,' 7 the more traditional juvenile court judges will
want to divert youth whose behavior and personal stories suggest they should be
spared criminal sanctions.
Diversion from juvenile court itself is also a century-old characteristic of the
system. In the early days of the first juvenile court in Chicago, Judge Julian Mack
developed diversion so he would not be overwhelmed by cases that did not belong in his juvenile court.
[He] devised an ingenious remedy: the complaint system. He requested that
concerned individuals should make an informal complaint to the court's
probation department instead of filing a formal petition against a child. This
procedural change would allow the probation staff to investigate cases to
determine whether they merited judicial attention. After an investigation,
an officer could dismiss the complaint if it appeared groundless, attempt to
resolve any minor problems independently, file a petition against the child
if necessary ....

This policy gave the probation officers the discretion to

14 Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820-1935,
in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds. 2002).
15 THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992).
16 Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in the Jurisprudenceof Juvenile Courts,
in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 142, 146 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds. 2002).
17 See Franklin E. Zimring, PenalProportionalityfor the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity,
Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 271, 276 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds. 2000) ("As a matter of constitutional law ... we have known for a generation that those who administer juvenile court delinquency
dockets are in the business of punishing adolescent law violators.").
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determine which children should be brought to court .... The complaint
system served as an effective technique for managing the court's caseload.1 8
The current wave of referrals from schools represents much that the juvenile
court was designed to reject. Even at its worst, the "child saving" juvenile court
that was so criticized by reformers of the sixties 19 claimed to operate for the
benefit of the youth brought before it. 20 It is this quality of the juvenile court that
will give the defense bar purchase when it raises new defenses before juvenile
court judges who, while attending to due process, nevertheless would like to push
the wheel back (or forward!) to a due process court that exalts diversion over
punishment.
While the modern juvenile court does hold youth accountable - in the mid1990s many states made accountability explicit in their juvenile court laws - no
one expects the juvenile court to be punitive in the adult sense. 2 1 No one, that is,
except' teachers and school administrators who call police and refer behavior
problems to juvenile court. Those who make these referrals, we suggest, are not
motivated by good will for the misbehaving student. They are not making referrals because they believe that the juvenile court offers the best chance to turn
youth around and lead them towards productive lives as adults.
Rather, educators who call police are seeking in every case - from the annoying, disruptive student, to the violent, serious offender - to deter (the individual
and the rest of the student body), to incapacitate (by excluding the student from
school), and to punish. One searches in vain for a news story or judicial opinion
in which school administrators even pretend that they are having the youth arrested for his or her own good.22
18

David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: BeCENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 60 (Margaret K.
Rosenheim et al. eds. 2002).
19 See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d
ed. 1977) (1969).
20 The court's fiercest defenders never claimed that it was intentionally punitive. Justice
Harlan, for example, dissenting in In re Gault, observed that juvenile "courts are denominated civil,
not criminal, and are characteristically said not to administer criminal penalties." In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 66 (1967).
21 The criminal justice systems uses sanctions for purposes of retribution, deterrence of individual offenders and deterrence of society at large, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Michelle Cotton,
Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of CriminalPunishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000).
22 Of course, we do not suggest that having a youth arrested for his or her own good would be
tolerable. We make this point to reinforce the obviously punitive nature of school referrals to juvenile
court. Indeed, Pennsylvania legislators in 2002 thought so little of the rehabilitative nature of the
juvenile justice system that they passed a law that prohibited Philadelphia - and only Philadelphia delinquent youth who were returned from placement to attend regular classes. 24 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 21-2134 (2006). In 2005, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held this statute unconstitutional as violating due process, because some students were denied opportunity to challenge their

yond the Myth of Immaculate Construction,in A
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There are thus two points to be reinforced here. First, school administrators
are referring youth to juvenile court, even when such referrals will be harmful to
them. In such cases, administrators who focus on the educational needs of the
majority of their students have dropped the pretense of also trying to attend to
the needs of troubled students. Their referrals to juvenile court are meant to rid
the schools of "troublemakers."
Second, juvenile court judges have - and have always had - the inherent ability to divert a significant number of these referrals, especially when they believe
that a youth really does not belong in juvenile court. School based referrals might
be dismissed outright or they might be deflected to any of the rash of diversion
programs that courts have created in recent years. These diversion programs may
include community courts, youth aid panels, teen courts, and probation-based
diversion programs. Youth are diverted to these programs because juvenile court
judges believe that these alternatives will do more good and less harm than sending the youth to trial and deeper into the juvenile justice system.
Judges who are concerned about inappropriate referrals should exercise their
inherent power to divert cases. This can be done through instructions to juvenile
probation officers who screen cases, or it can be done at the bar of the court. In
either case, it is incumbent upon the juvenile defense bar to make legal arguments that judges can use, and that can withstand appellate scrutiny. This strategy
will be effective only if it is used in proper cases, i.e., where the youth's misbehavior does not pose obvious dangers; and when the misbehavior is more appropriately, and obviously, handled in the school setting.
It is important to note that judges know what to do with serious cases. Referrals to court of students who commit serious crimes and whose presence in the
school represents a serious threat to the school community are appropriate. But
judges with whom we have spoken resent having their courts cluttered with less
serious school-based cases. This is especially true, as we will see in the next section, when cases involve special education students.
B.

Lawyers Must Present Good Legal and Factual Arguments - Effectively
Rewriting the Narratives Which Schools Present - So That Judges
Feel Comfortable Exercising Their Discretion to Divert
InappropriateCases

Lawyers for children cannot rely on judges' good will. Lawyers must give
judges reasons for exercising their discretion. We offer three.
The first involves cases of either general or special education students. The
argument is that the child under any circumstance does not truly belong in juvenile court. This is a standard defense argument that this youth did not cause
transfers to alternative education institutions. D.C. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 879 A.2d 408 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005).
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enough harm to warrant being punished or treated by the juvenile justice system.2 3 Courts will not divert youth who cause serious harm. Nor will they divert
repeat offenders. But defense attorneys will also have to overcome the seeming
reluctance of many juvenile courts to divert school based referrals, merely because they are brought by schools. Defense attorneys must consistently argue that
there is nothing in any juvenile code in any state that limits a court's discretion to
divert because of the identity of the complainant.
The second defense we call a "manifestation defense." It applies solely to special education students and is modeled on the manifestation inquiry that has long
been a part of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).24 In the
dependency context, courts already have recognized the need for information regarding a child's disability when making a determination on adjudication. In In re
C.M.T., a thirteen-year-old student was adjudicated dependent for habitual truancy.2 5 C.M.T. had Asperger's Syndrome, and therefore received special education programming and services under IDEA. At trial, C.M.T. sought
unsuccessfully to introduce evidence that her absences were due to her disabilities. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the proffered evidence, including expert testimony regarding C.M.T.'s disability and its effect on
her attendance, was incorrectly excluded and therefore reversed the adjudication.26 The Superior Court reasoned that before adjudicating a child, the court
must conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances of the matter and
receive information from all interested persons, including psychological experts.27 The School district argued that because the IDEA provides a mechanism
for challenging inappropriate special educational practices, dependency court is
not an appropriate forum for evaluating whether a child's behavior stems from
his disability. The Court, however, rejected this reasoning, holding that the information in an IEP or MD developed by the school would be extremely relevant in
the dependency context.2 8
At the time of this writing, we know of only two delinquency cases 29 where a
child offered the defense of manifestation. In the first non-precedential decision,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's finding of delinquency of a child with autism spectrum disorder, who, as a manifestation of his
disability, engaged in disruptive behavior at school and was charged with several
counts of felony, misdemeanor, and summary offenses. D.A.S was an 11-year-old
23

See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 312;

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 202-236

(2003).

24 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.523-524 (2001), supra note 12.
25 In re C.M.T., 861 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Super. 2004).
26 Id. at 354-55.
27 Id. at 356 (quoting In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10 (Pa. Super. 2003)); In the Interest of Michael Y.,
530 A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. 1987).
28 Id. at 357.
29 In the Interest of D.A.S., No. 668 MDA 2005, slip op. (Pa. Super. Apr. 4, 2006).
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boy diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome, a form of autism spectrum disorder.
Immediately after a move from a regular education classroom to a full-time emotional support classroom his behavior began to deteriorate and he was referred to
the juvenile justice system. D.A.S.'s first contact with law enforcement arose
when he raised a chair in a threatening manner over another student. He was
detained after school and confronted by a school social worker. The social worker
used a physical restraint on him, causing him to become further agitated and try
to escape the restraint. The school officials called the police and D.A.S.'s first
juvenile petition was filed. After D.A.S. returned to school, his parents filed a
request for a Special Education Due Process Hearing pursuant to IDEA, alleging
various violations of state and federal law. Before the hearing, however, D.A.S.
was again referred to law enforcement for acting out in response to being forced
to attend recess with students from the emotional support classroom, contrary to
what his IEP required (recess with his regular classroom). D.A.S. again became
very agitated and was moved from room to room, unable to be calmed. He was
finally subjected to another physical restraint and responded with disruptive behavior. The police were again called, and another juvenile petition was filed.
During the pendency of the delinquency matter, D.A.S.'s Due Process hearing
took place and the Hearing Officer found that the School District had failed to
reevaluate D.A.S. and provide him with necessary special education supports and
services, including appropriate behavior supports during the time of the alleged
delinquent acts. The Special Education Due Process Appeals Panel affirmed the
Hearing Officer's finding, agreeing that D.A.S.'s rights were violated under both
state and federal laws. The Juvenile Court dismissed a few of the charges, but
found that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that D.A.S.
committed various felony, misdemeanor, and summary offenses and adjudicated
him delinquent because he required treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation.
D.A.S. asserted that due to his disability, he was unable to form the requisite
intent to commit the acts alleged and therefore could not be held accountable.
This case exemplifies the defense of manifestation in that D.A.S.'s school outbursts were disability-related and arguably the result of the school district's denial of his right to appropriate special education services. In support of his claim
that that his actions were involuntary and a manifestation of his autism spectrum
disorder, D.A.S. attempted on appeal to introduce expert testimony about Asperger's Syndrome, and the findings from the Special Education Due Process
Hearing and Appeal. The Superior Court refused. Disregarding the Special Education Due Process Hearing Officers' findings, and any relevant information
about the symptoms and effects of Asperger's Syndrome, the Court found that
there was "no connection between the school district's 'purported failure' to implement an individualized educational plan and whether D.A.S. had the requisite

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

mens rea to commit the aforementioned offenses." ' 30 The Court further held that
D.A.S.'s capacity to understand and control his actions may be a result of his
disability, but the standard for determining culpability in a delinquency action is
whether the child had the intent necessary to commit the offenses. 3 1 The Court
found a distinction between capacity and culpability and therefore affirmed
D.A.S.'s delinquent adjudication.3 2
In addition to offering evidence of a disability through IEPs and Manifestation
Determinations developed by school officials, as offered by D.A.S., courts have
also considered expert testimony regarding a child's disability and its impact on
the child's behavior. In a case following D.A.S., the Pennsylvania Superior Court
upheld, in another unreported decision, a child's delinquency adjudication despite offering a manifestation defense. 33 At the trial level, A.M.H. was not permitted to introduce evidence of his IEP or MD, even though the court recognized
that his behavior may have stemmed from his disability. Contrary to the ruling in
D.A.S., the Superior Court actually held that the trial court erred in excluding
information relevant to the child's disability, but that this was harmless error and
therefore did not overturn the adjudication. The concurring justice reiterated that
A.M.H.'s manifestation determination stated that he had a specific learning disability and his behavior stemmed from this disability, but nothing in the record
demonstrated this. The concurring justice felt that expert testimony should have
indicated this correlation. Although not ultimately successful in these two Pennsylvania cases, the manifestation defense should be considered and used by advocates in cases where children have been referred to the juvenile justice system but
the school has failed to provide them necessary educational or emotional
supports.
In the special education context, these issues are especially important. Eileen
Ordover offers thoughtful proposals for advocates to use IDEA to prevent school
districts from criminalizing the behavior of special education students.34 We build
on Ordover's proposals for advocates to urge juvenile courts to exercise discretion in IDEA cases. Ordover suggests that advocates ask juvenile courts to either
30 Id. at 12.
31 Id. at 6.
32 D.A.S. petitioned for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied review of the case.
33 In the Interest of A.M.H., No. 479 EDA 2005, slip op. (Pa. Super. May 18, 2005).
34 EILEEN L. ORDOVER, CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION, WHEN SCHOOLS CRIMINALIZE
DISABILITY: EDUCATION LAW STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES (2002), available at http://www.

cleweb.org/Downloads/when-schoolscriminalize-disabil.htm. We agree with Ordover's approach to
appeal to juvenile court's exercise of discretion. Obviously, IDEA violations cannot be a per se reason
for dismissing juvenile court petitions, since juvenile courts will not dismiss petitions in serious cases.
There is no reason to think that the common law in this area can be developed to require such dismissals. Defense attorneys must bring such motions to dismiss only in appropriate cases that will appeal
to the juvenile court's sense that the case really "doesn't belong here."
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dismiss the petition outright or delay consideration of it until special education
due process has run its course.35
Ordover argues:
[T]he primary goal is to convince the court that this is primarily (or at least
to a significant degree) an education matter, in light of the facts that the
alleged delinquent act occurred in school, the incident was or may be related to disability, services and supports to address the behavior underlying
the incident are required to be made available to the student under state
and federal education law, and there is a specialized legal mechanism for
dealing with disability-related education issues, and that therefore, the court
should stay the juvenile proceedings so that the student 36may attempt to
resolve these education issues through the IDEA system.
This is a sound framework. We add to Ordover's list a qualification that the
offense should not be serious. The goal is to convince the court to exercise its
discretion. Not only does the behavior need to arise from the disability, the court
must believe that the behavior did not cause such great harm that juvenile court
intervention is warranted. The court will have to be convinced of the existence of
the rationales described above for diversion - in particular that punishment is
inappropriate and that the risks to the community of non-juvenile court action
will be minimal. This was especially true in D.A.S.'s case, where the school district clearly failed D.A.S.'s needs and did not provide him with adequate supports
to curb his disruptive behavior. Each instance of disruptive behavior was minimal-calling a teacher names, pouring water out of a vase, scratching the wall,
and throwing furniture37-and exactly the kind of behavior the school should be
equipped to handle without the involvement of law enforcement.
The third argument is a variation of the "manifestation defense." This argument reasons that students whose conduct is not volitional, but which arises from
a disability, are more like "status offenders" than delinquents. (Like circles of a
Venn diagram, this argument blends with the "manifestation defense," and is part
of the effort to convince juvenile court judges to exercise their discretion to dismiss or divert cases.)
There are two kinds of status offenders. A status offense for criminal law purposes is a wrong defined by the existence of a condition, such as a narcotics addiction. It has long been clear that criminal penalties cannot constitutionally be
attached to a condition or status alone but must be directed to acts committed by
35

Id. at 20, 54.

36
37

Id.at 55.
In the Interest of D.A.S., at 2.
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the accused. 38 The second kind of status offense refers to acts which can 39
only be
committed by a minor, and would not be crimes if committed by adults.
At first blush, it appears that defense counsel for special education students
cannot claim that minor misbehavior arising from a disability is a status offense
that cannot be punished in delinquency court. After all, the rebuttal goes, the
student is being punished for acts (such as threats, or kicking), and not for having
a disability. Thus, this is not like Robinson v. California,40 but more like Powell v.
Texas,4 1 in which a plurality of the court upheld a conviction for public drunkenness of a chronic alcoholic.
Juvenile courts can certainly follow Powell and find that students with disabilities can be adjudicated delinquent for their conduct. However, juvenile courts
have discretion, and the challenge for advocates is convincing the court to use it.
This is less about logic than about persuading the court to follow its inclinations
based on the facts of the case.4 2 Defense attorneys must present juvenile court
judges with a different story line than that presented by schools.
Our experience suggests that judges in appropriate cases are willing to reject
logic for experience. They are willing to make choices among competing narratives. For example, Pennsylvania policy rejects treating status offenders as delinquents. The state's appellate courts have made clear that status offenders cannot
become delinquent by being in contempt of court orders to avoid running away
or to obey one's parents.43 Some police and prosecutors have tried to get around
this problem by advising parents to charge their children with theft of their
clothes or with making threats. While there are no reported decisions in this area,
we know of judges who have declined adjudicating delinquent children who are
brought before them under those circumstances. To some degree, judges are finding that the elements of the crimes are not being met - that there was no intent to
steal clothes, or that the threats were not real. But we surmise that judges are also
uncomfortable turning a status offender into a delinquent through fabricated
charges.
Lawyers must play to this discomfort. While our clients do not have a right to
have charges dismissed or to have cases diverted, we can and should seek to create a climate in juvenile courts across the country in which diversion and dismissals are once again a routine and accepted part of the juvenile court culture.
38 Lee Teitelbaum, Status Offenses and Status Offenders, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 16, at 159 (emphasis in original source cited). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a state statute criminalizing narcotics addiction).
39 Teitelbaum, supra note 28.
40 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
41 392 U.S. 514 (1998).
42 "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
43 See, e.g., In Interest of Tasseing H., 281 Pa. Super. 400, 422 A.2d 530 (1980).

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE

C. Exercise of Discretion Can Occur at Any Stage of the Juvenile Court
Process Before a Youth is Adjudicated Delinquent
Juvenile court gives defense counsel many bites at the diversion apple. We
know of only one written, but unreported, decision, since zero tolerance policies
took hold in the mid-1990s, in which a juvenile court judge accepted this argument and dismissed a case of arguably delinquent behavior.41 There was no appeal, so the decision's reach is minimal. Its argument, however, is powerful, and it
is one that can be made at any point in the juvenile court process prior to a
finding of guilt (i.e., an adjudication of delinquency).
J.G. was a fourteen-year-old girl who was charged with assault and making
threats. She was also diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder, borderline
Intellectual Functioning, Functional Encopresis, and borderline Personality Disorder. Defense counsel argued that J.G. was incompetent to stand trial. The court
agreed, but in its opinion went further.
The judge said that he was "taken aback" by testimony of J.G.'s teacher and
the school administrator. The court noted that J.G.'s behavior could have been
managed with a TSS (therapeutic support staff) worker, and that J.G. was inappropriately placed in a classroom with older students. Such placement, the judge
observed, "seems to be a flirtation with disaster." The court went on:
This type of situation is best left to be handled in the system it is presently
in - the school and mental health areas - which should have in place specific
methods and programs to deal with just this type of case. The Court believes these types of occurrences are more properly dealt with by the individual school district and the Mental Health-Mental Retardation Agency by
virtue of the great discretion allowed them in the implementation of these
solutions.
After a thorough review of the case law, the Court was unable to find a
factual scenario analogous to the case at point as handled through the criminal justice system. This omission merely leads us to our assumption that this
type of case is usually and probably best handled through other, better
suited avenues, without resorting to the criminal court system ....
While this decision is not intended to effectively cut off all access to the
criminal court system by school authorities, the instances where it is appropriate should be rare indeed. Thus, in these types of cases, the criminal
court system is to be considered only as a "last resort," after the exhaustion
of all administrative remedies that are available in the school and to mental
45
health areas outside of the school setting.
44 In re A Minor Child, JU-98-119, 120, 121, 122 (Ct. Com P1. Northumberland County, Pa.,
Aug. 6, 1998), available at http://www.kidstogether.org/pa-crtl.htm.
45 Id.
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This opinion is noteworthy in many ways. The judge did not have to dismiss
the petition, but he wanted to. Defense counsel presented evidence of J.G.'s disabilities, convinced the court that the risks could be managed better by other systems, persuaded the judge that the school - through a more thoughtful Individual
Education Plan - could have done a much better job of managing J.G.'s behavior, and made a reasonable argument that the offense was not so serious that it
should trump all of the other arguments.4 6 This contrasts with the court's treatment of D.A.S. discussed above. The Judge in J.G.'s case factored in all the relevant evidence that the Court in D.A.S. disregarded when making its decision.
Had the Court in D.A.S. considered D.A.S.'s disability and its possible impact on
the child's behavior, it may have also found other systems better able to manage
his disruptive behavior and similarly dismissed the delinquency petition, rather
than adjudicating him delinquent.

II.

TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES ARE AVAILABLE TO
REDUCE OR DEFEAT ALLEGATIONS OF DELINQUENCY ARISING
FROM SCHOOL-BASED CONDUCT

The above discussion encourages defense counsel to invoke the juvenile

court's historically broad discretion to divert youth charged with criminal conduct
out of the juvenile justice system. In cases involving special education students,
defense counsel are urged additionally to look behind the student's conduct to
the underlying disability as a further justification for limiting court involvement.
In the event that diversion is unavailable, lawyers representing youth in juvenile court may still invoke the same traditional defenses to these delinquency
charges as they would in a criminal proceeding on behalf of an adult client. This
section will explore the application of criminal defense strategies to allegations of
delinquency arising out of school-based conduct. In particular, we will look at
three common school-related charges: terroristic threats, disorderly conduct, and
simple or aggravated assault.
A.

Terroristic Threats

Following the murders of thirteen students and one teacher at Columbine
High School in Colorado in 1999, schools and law enforcement cracked down on
students' verbal expressions that directly or indirectly threatened violence toward
other students, teachers, or the school community in general.4 7 Whether in the
form of oral threats, written hit lists, drawings, web-based messages, or other
46 The Arizona Supreme Court adopted a similar rationale in reversing an adjudication of delinquency in the case of a basic education student who was in an alternative school for children with
behavioral problems. See the discussion of In re Julio L., infra, at text accompanying notes 116-129.
47 Barbara J. Brunner., The Right to Write? Free Expression Rights of Pennsylvania's Creative
Students After Columbine, 107 DICK. L. REV. 891, 909-10 (2003); Fiona Ruthven, Is the True Threat
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forms of expression, suspension, expulsion, and arrest rapidly became the predictable response. While some courts refused to be swayed by the post-Columbine climate in adjudicating these charges,4" others felt the heightened need to
ensure safety at schools warranted erring on the side of making findings that
would fit statutory requirements for conviction. 49 In both instances, courts wrestled with determining where the First Amendment ended and the criminal law
began, and with distinguishing between protected speech and punishable

threats.5 °
The crime of terroristic threats has repeatedly bumped up against the First
Amendment. 5 1 In adjudicating a charge of terroristic threats, courts must be cautious to ensure that application of the statutory standard does not exceed that
which is constitutionally permissible. 52 While there is a substantial body of case
law allowing a diluted application of the First Amendment in schools,53 the rethe Student or the School Board? Punishing Threatening Student Expression, 88 IowA L. REV. 931
(2003).
48 In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 93 P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004);
Wisconsin v. Douglas D., 626 N.W. 2d 725 (Wis. 2001); In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
49 Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. 2001); In re J.H., 797 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super.
2002).
50 Williams Bird, Constitutional Law-True Threat Doctrine and Public School Speech-An Expansive View of a School's Authority to Discipline Allegedly Threatening Student Speech Arising Off
Campus, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 111 (2003); Sarah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats
Posed, School and Judicial Analysis in Need of Redirection, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 663 (2003).
51 In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 93 P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004);
In re Douglas D., 626 N.W. 2d 725 (Wis. 2001); In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d 967 (Mass. 2001); In re J.H., 797 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super.
2002); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486,
1490-91 (1st Cir.1997); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Sarah
E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed, School and Judicial Analysis In Need of Redirection, 2003
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 663 (2003).
52 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir.
1997).
53 In Tinker, the United States Supreme Court declared, "[ult can hardly be argued that neither
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," confirming that First Amendment protections extend to children in schools. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court added that the free speech rights
of children in schools must be balanced with the authority of the States, acting through school officials, to maintain order in schools and protect the rights of other students and teachers. Accordingly,
conduct that is a material disruption or "involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others"
may not warrant First Amendment protection. Id. at 513.
Since Tinker, courts have used its "disruption" and "interference" language to limit the First
Amendment rights of students. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(holding that student speech in student assembly was "offensively lewd and indecent" and, accordingly, did not warrant First Amendment protection given the school setting, emphasizing that, "the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings").
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moval of these cases from the school realm to the courtroom re-instates the obligation to ensure proper adherence to the First Amendment - whether the
defendant is a juvenile or an adult.
As a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits governmental actors from
directing what persons may see, read, speak, or hear.5 4 Free speech protections
do not extend, however, to certain categories or modes of expression, such as
A more recent interpretation of the Tinker standard in federal Courts of Appeals has provided
that the extent of a student's First Amendment protection is more limited the younger the student is,
reasoning that younger students are impressionable and less capable of understanding their own
views. See, e.g., Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that elementary
student did not have a constitutional right to circulate petition regarding animal rights cause); Muller
v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997)
(allowing significant restrictions to student dissemination of religious materials by elementary age
student); Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a policy
allowing distribution of religious materials at a public high school by non-students was constitutional
but that it was not constitutional at an elementary school because of the relative impressionability of
the younger students and their inability to differentiate the source of the information). The limited
rights are also justified by an assumption that society has a lesser interest in protecting the views of
young children and that there are higher priorities and values in elementary education than first
Amendment principles. See, e.g., Muller, 98 F.3d at 1538.
These qualifications on the First Amendment freedoms of young people are not universal, and
Tinker remains the Supreme Court paradigm against which First Amendment claims by students,
when claims of discrimination against individual speech, must be evaluated. See, e.g., Sypniewski v.
Warren Hills Regional Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1033
(2000) (finding that students were likely to succeed on merits for claim that school's racial discrimination ban was overbroad and violated their First Amendment rights); Boyd County High School Gay
Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Education of Boyd County, Ky., 258 F.Supp.2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction to student alliance on First Amendment claims, providing that Tinker
stands for the principle that a "heckler's veto" may not justify suppression of student speech); Burch
v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing that school district policy requiring high school
students to seek prior approval for all written materials was overly broad under the First Amendment
and the Tinker progeny).
Students, however, may have trouble protecting expressions that are viewed by school officials as
threats given the judiciary's willingness to read the Tinker protection narrowly and the "substantial
disorder" exception to protection broadly in evaluating student First Amendment challenges, especially for young children. See, e.g., In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr.2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that student poem was substantially disruptive enough to the school environment to lack First
Amendment protection.), rev'd, 16 Cal. Rptr.3d 61 (2004); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d
367 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court in holding that a high school student's free speech rights
were not violated when she was suspended for three days for allegedly threatening to shoot a high
school guidance counselor over a schedule change by finding the statement to be a "true threat"
unprotected by the First Amendment); Williams Bird, Constitutional Law-True Threat Doctrine and
Public School Speech-An Expansive View of a School's Authority to DisciplineAllegedly Threatening
Student Speech Arising Off Campus, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK. L. REV. 111 (2003); Sarah E. Redfield,
Threats Made, Threats Posed, School andJudicialAnalysis in Need of Redirection, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC.
& L.J. 663 (2003); Fiona Ruthven, Is the True Threat the Student or the School Board? Punishing
Threatening Student Expression, 88 IOWA L. REV. 931 (2003).
54

Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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obscenity, defamation, and fighting words. 55 The government is permitted to regulate speech that falls within these categories because the speech is, "of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
' 56
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Of

course, the rule remains that the government's regulation of speech within these
categories may not, 57in general, be based on the content of the speech or the

speaker's viewpoint.
In Watts v. United States, 58 the Supreme Court recognized that threats of vio-

lence also fell within the realm of speech that the government can proscribe without offending the First Amendment. Although there may be some political or
social value associated with threatening words in some circumstances, the govern-

ment has an overriding interest in "protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.",59 The Court in Watts, however, set forth no particular definition or description of a true threat that distinguishes an unprotected

threat from protected speech. Thus, lower courts have been left to ascertain for
themselves when a statement triggers the government's interest in preventing the
disruption and fear of violence associated with a threat.
The federal courts of appeals have adopted a test to parse true threats from
protected speech, but the courts differ in their application of the test.60 All the

courts that have considered the issue have consistently applied an objective test
that focuses on whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported threat
as a serious expression of intent to cause a present or future harm.6 1 The courts

differ, however, with respect to whose viewpoint - that of the speaker or the
recipient of the speech - must be considered in determining how the statement
should be interpreted.6 2
55 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
56 Id. at 382 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
57 Id. at 383-86.
58 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
59 R.A.V., supra note 55, at 388.
60 See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing the differing
circuit approaches to ascertaining a true threat); Williams Bird, ConstitutionalLaw-True Threat Doctrine and Public School Speech-An Expansive View of a School's Authority to Discipline Allegedly
Threatening Student Speech Arising Off Campus, 26 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK. L. REV. 111, 119-23
(2003).
61 See id.
62 Compare Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) with United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 968 (1994). See also United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490,
1492 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding test is whether "the defendant should have reasonably foreseen whether
the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made"); United States v.
Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that "in order to convict, a fact finder must determine that the recipient of the in-context threat reasonably feared it would be carried out"); see also
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Two recent California cases actually illustrate the courts' reluctance to
criminalize expression, even in the school setting. In In re Ryan D.,63 a high
school student drew a picture in his art class of a hooded youth discharging a
handgun at the back of a female police officer's head. The police officer was
depicted wearing a particular badge number. In fact, the badge number was the
same as that worn by a female police officer who had issued the youth a citation
for marijuana possession several weeks earlier. The art teacher found the picture
"disturbing" and "scary." 64 The teacher then showed the picture to-a school administrator, who in turn showed it to the police officer. When the school's assistant principal confronted the student, the youth admitted he had depicted himself
shooting the officer who had issued the citation, and agreed that it was "reasonable" to expect that the officer would eventually see the drawing. 65 When the officer was shown the drawing later that same day, she "was pretty shocked" and
"upset" and "very uncomfortable." 66 As a precaution, the officer stayed away
from the school for the next few days. The student was charged with terroristic
threats. At his adjudicatory hearing he testified that the painting was an expression of his feelings, that he was "letting his anger out," that he did not expect the
officer to see the painting and that he did not intend to scare her. 67 The youth
was nevertheless adjudicated delinquent. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed.
Stating that a criminal threat is "the expression of an intent to inflict serious
evil upon another person," and that, at the time the minor acted, he must have
had the specific intent that the officer would be shown the painting, the court first
found that a drawing by itself is necessarily ambiguous and that, standing alone,
the painting would not constitute a criminal threat.6 s Examining the surrounding
circumstances for evidence that would eliminate such ambiguity, the court was
not persuaded that a criminal threat had been communicated. The court noted in
particular that the student had submitted the drawing pursuant to a class assignment, the incident had occurred several weeks earlier, and the evidence was insufficient to show that the student intended the police officer to see the
painting. 69 As a perceived threat, the court held that the painting was "not so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of the execution of a crime.., that would result
Fiona Ruthven, Is the True Threat the Student or the School Board? Punishing Threatening Student
Expression, 88 IoWA L. REV. 931 (2003).

63
64
65
66
67
68
69

123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 100 Cal. App. 4th 854 (3d Dist. 2002).
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id. at 859.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
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in death or great bodily injury."'7' The minor did not direct any gestures or facial
expressions toward the officer, and had no contact with the officer following the
incident. Moreover, neither the school authorities, nor the victim, nor the police
took immediate action against the youth - suggesting that none of them in fact
perceived a 'gravity of purpose' or "immediate prospect" of actually executing
such a threat. 71 Acknowledging that the painting reflected anger on the youth's
part, the court still72found that the painting appeared to be nothing more than
"pictorial ranting." And while the court noted that it was "intemperate" and
demonstrated "extremely poor judgment," the court also wrote that the "criminal
law does not, and cannot, implement a zero tolerance policy concerning the expressive depiction of violence." 73
In re George T.7 4 likewise involved an appeal of a delinquency adjudication for
terroristic threats initially affirmed by the California Court of Appeal 75 but subsequently reversed by the California Supreme Court. At issue in George T were
three pages of poetry, which contained the heading "Dark Poetry" on the first
page. The poetry was written by a high school student and given to at least three
other students in the school, one during the course of a high school English class,
one while passing in the hall, and one after school. Two of the three students
barely knew George T.76

The first page included the phrase, "For I can be the next kid to bring guns to
kill students at school." Two of the three students testified that they viewed it as 77a
"death threat," and that they were very scared and upset by what was written.
Other poems written by the student also contained references to being the "next
high school killer," as well as additional expressions of sadness and alienation
from his peers generally. 78 The third student testified at trial that she had also
read the poetry, knew the student, did not think he was violent and that, if anything, the poetry made her feel sad. 7 9 George T. himself testified that he had
indeed written all of the poetry in question, and conceded that his words would
be "scary" and "frightening" and would "obviously threaten" other students if
they did not know him and did not know he was kidding. 80 He also testified,
however, that he did not intend his poems to be a threat, that he thought the
students to whom he gave the poems would see the poems as a joke, and that he
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 864-65.
93 P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004).
126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id. at 371.
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believed they wrote "dark poetry" themselves and therefore would not be
scared. 8 ' Finally, he testified that he titled the poetry "Dark Poetry" because he
wanted the reader to know this was "dark poetry," but he did not believe the title
suggested the writer would do what he wrote.82
In reversing the Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court termed the
poem "ambiguous and plainly equivocal. '83 The Court required that the "words
actually used must constitute a threat in light of the surrounding circumstances," 84 and found that only the last two lines contained any criminal intent and that the word used conveying this intent was "can" not "will." According to
the Court, the fear of the victims was thus their own view, converting what the
author said he could do into a statement of what he would do. Additionally, examining the surrounding circumstances, the Court found "incriminating circumstances ...

noticeably lacking." 85 Specifically, there was no history of animosity

or conflict among the students, no threatening gestures or mannerisms accompanied the poem, and there was no conduct that could have suggested to the 'victims' that there was an immediate prospect of execution of a threat to kill
anyone.86
Significantly, while the Court did take the timing of the poem into account
(not only post-Columbine, but also only sixteen days after a shooting at another
California school), the Court stated that "[e]nsuring a safe school environment
and protecting freedom of expression, however, are not necessarily antagonistic
goals." 87 The Court was careful in acknowledging the conflict presented by the
case - "a school administration's interest in ensuring the safety of its students and
faculty versus students' right to engage in creative expression" 88 - but also made
clear that its ruling held only that the poem did not constitute a criminal threat.
Thus, the Court endorsed the action of the school in responding to, and investigating the victims' concerns in the first instance.89
While the student's reference to Columbine in George T. and the timing of the
challenged expression did not prevent a reversal of the adjudication in that case,
the backdrop of school violence played a more overt role in cases in Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts in which adjudications of terroristic threats were upheld on
appeal. In In re J.H.,90 the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a finding of
terroristic threats where a high school student was charged with threatening his
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id.
93 P.3d at 1017.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id. at 1019.
Id.
Id.
In re J.H., 797 A.2d 260 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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high school drama teacher in class. The charge arose when the student, after adlibbing the word "fuck" several times during a reading in drama class, told his
teacher that if she followed through with her statement that she would contact his
probation officer if he didn't stop, "it would be the last thing [she] ever did." 91
aware that he was threatening her, he
When the teacher then asked J.H. if he was
92
responded that he was "promising her."
Under Pennsylvania law, neither the ability to carry out the threat nor a belief
by the person threatened that the threat will be carried out is an element of the
crime. 93 Pennsylvania law, however, also provides that "mere spur-of-the-moment threats which result from anger",94 are excluded from the statute. J.H. conceded that he threatened a crime of violence, but argued that his comment was
spontaneous and made in anger at the moment, thus not evidencing the requisite
intent to terrorize.95
The court rejected J.H.'s characterization that the threat was made in the context of a heated verbal exchange or confrontation. Looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the court noted that J.H. was not only calm at the beginning of the
class, but at one point also apologized and promised to stop using profanity.
When he continued, his drama teacher indicated she would contact his probation
officer, and the threatening remarks then followed. The court then acknowledged
the particular seriousness of threats made in schools in light of recent incidents of
school violence:
Finally, as a result of the numerous incidents of violence which have occurred in the school setting over the past several years, this Court recognizes the seriousness of any threat made by a student against a teacher or
another student. Indeed we have acknowledged that in order to facilitate
the "strong public interest in reducing the level of violence within our
schools and in the community in general, that it is of paramount importance
that our schools must be kept as centers of learning free of fear for personal
safety. This concept of safety encompasses the notion of teachers and students being secure and free from the fear of becoming victims of senseless
violence."

96

In Commonwealth v. Milo M.,97 the court likewise took account of the "actual
and potential violence in public schools",98 in affirming a finding of terroristic
91 Id. at 261.
92 Id.
93 Commonwealth v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
94 Id. at 865. See also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 730-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003);
Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A. 2d 999 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
95 In re J.H., at 262.
96 Id. at 263 (citing In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633, 639 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
97 Commonwealth v. Milo, 740 N.E. 2d 967 (Mass. 2001).
98 Id. at 973.
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threats. Milo M. involved two drawings made by a twelve-year-old student depicting the student shooting his teacher. The first drawing was taken from the
student by another teacher as he drew it outside the classroom and then shown to
the teacher. 99 The student then made a second similar drawing and asked the
teacher if she wanted that one also. Upon seeing the second drawing after asking
another student to bring it to her, the teacher testified that she became "apprehensive" and "[a]fraid for [her] safety."
Like many other state laws criminalizing threats, Massachusetts law provides
that "[t]he elements of threatening a crime include an expression of intention to
inflict a crime on another and an ability to do so in circumstances that would
justify apprehension on the part of the recipient of the threat."1 00 Although the
apprehension of the victim is measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, the court readily found the teacher's fear met this standard.' 1 With respect to the student's ability to carry out the threat, the court looked at the
drawing in the context in which it was given to the teacher and the surrounding
circumstances. Here the court found that intent to carry out the threat could have
been inferred from the content of the drawing itself (a graphic depiction of the
student shooting the teacher), the fact that the student made more than one such
drawing, and the student's "angry and defiant manner" when he held out the
second drawing to the teacher.' 0 2 The court likewise upheld the finding that the
student had a present ability to carry out the threat - concluding that although
there was no evidence the student possessed an immediate ability to carry out the
threat, this didn't mean
"that the [juvenile] could not have carried out the threat
10 3
at a later time."
Finally, "given the recent highly publicized school-related shootings by students," the court took "judicial notice of the actual and potential violence in public schools.' 1 4 The court noted that the common knowledge of such incidents
made such violence in schools "indisputably true." Recounting the history of
school shootings and other violence going back to reported incidents starting in
1996, the court specifically found, "These factors, when considered in light of the
'climate of apprehension' concerning school violence in which this incident occurred, make the [teacher's] fear
that the juvenile could carry out the threat quite
10 5
reasonable and justifiable."
99 Id. at 969, n. 2 (finding that the first drawing could not have constituted a threat because the
student himself did not actually communicate it to the teacher).
100 Id. (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 971.
102 Id. at 972.
103 Id. at 973. The court also noted the evidence below that the student had been seen "loitering" near the teacher's car later that same day.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 974. See also Jones v. State, 64 S.W.3d 728 (Ark. 2002) (concluding that a rap written
by a fifteen year-old high school student was a true threat where the victim's reaction was immediate
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B.

Disorderly Conduct

In many instances, the same type of conduct that has given rise to charges of
terroristic threats against students has also served as the basis for charges of disorderly conduct. Like cases involving allegations of terroristic threats, disorderly
conduct cases often implicate First Amendment concerns and thus also require
careful scrutiny of the alleged conduct within the express terms of the underlying
criminal statute.
In In re Douglas D., 1 °6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed an adjudication
for disorderly conduct in a case that illustrates the close connection between terroristic threats and disorderly conduct. Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that purely written speech - even speech that fails to cause an actual disturbance - could constitute disorderly conduct under Wisconsin law, although the
Court then held the speech protected by the First Amendment under the facts of
the case.1 °7 While the Court had no difficulty criminalizing pure speech as a matter of law, it nevertheless recognized its obligation to evaluate the offensive
speech against the backdrop of the First Amendment.
Douglas D. was an eighth grade student who, pursuant to a creative writing
assignment, wrote a story describing how a student named "Dick" cut his
teacher's head off with a machete after being kicked out of class by the teacher.
Douglas called the teacher "Mrs. C."' 10 8 In fact, Douglas wrote the story after he
was ousted from class by his teacher, who referred to herself as "Mrs. C." 10 9
Upon reading the story, Mrs. C. interpreted it as a threat to her if she disciplined
Douglas again, became frightened, and reported the incident to the assistant prinand unequivocal, the threat was not conditional, the threat was communicated directly to the victim,
the defendant had a record and the victim believed he would carry out the threat); Doe v. Pulaski, 306
F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding expulsion of student, finding student did "intend" to
communicate the threat when he showed writings to a friend of the victim, and that the words constituted a true threat where the victim could reasonably have feared for her well-being, that the letter
was "personal" and clearly written to the victim, that it appeared the defendant wanted the victim to
be scarred and that the defendant portrayed himself as a "tough guy"); In re Kyle M., 27 P.3d 804, 809
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (thirteen year-old student accused of threatening classmate who had dumped
him, when he said he was going to bring a gun to school and shoot two students, characterizing it as a
"Columbine" thing; court held state met its burden of proving true threat where a "reasonable person
could foresee that his words would be taken as a serious expression of an intent to inflict serious
bodily harm and his words were not the result of mistake, duress or coercion"). See also In re Ryan
A., 39 P.3d 543, 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), where a juvenile drove past victim's house, yelled a vulgar
death threat which victim did not hear but mother did, and victim was not scared or threatened. The
court held victim's fear is not an element of true threat so long as other requirements are established,
including finding that threat included the name of the victim, was part of a history of threats, tone was
frightening and a reasonable person could have interpreted it as a true threat.
106 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001).
107 Id. at 730.
108 Id. at 730-31.
109 Id.
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cipal. The assistant principal then spoke to Douglas, who apologized for the story
and stated that he did not intend the story to be a threat. Douglas was given a
one-day suspension from the school; when he returned to school, he was transferred to a different English class.
Approximately six weeks later, police filed a delinquency petition against
Douglas, alleging that he had violated the disorderly conduct statute by making a
"death threat" and engaging in "abusive conduct under circumstances in which
the conduct tends to cause a disturbance."' 1 0 In adjudicating Douglas delinquent,
the juvenile court found that Douglas had communicated a "direct threat" to
Mrs. C. that provoked a disturbance, in that Mrs. C. became "very upset."' '
On appeal, Douglas asserted first that his creative writing assignment was protected speech under the First Amendment and second, even if not protected
speech, the disorderly conduct statute applied to conduct and could not be construed to criminalize purely written speech. 112 The Court of Appeals rejected
both arguments and affirmed the adjudication.1 13 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed, upholding the applicability of the disorderly conduct statute to pure
speech, but finding the particular speech in this case protected under the First
Amendment.
First, the Court considered whether the disorderly conduct statute proscribed
purely written speech, even if the speech did not cause a disturbance." 4 The
Court held that the statute could be applied to speech alone, to the extent that
"in some circumstances words carry with them proscribable non-speech elements," 115 such as speech that is unreasonably loud or speech that conveys an
express or implied threat or challenge to fight. Second, the Court considered
whether Douglas's speech was unprotected "abusive" conduct, within the reach
of the disorderly conduct statute. With regard to this element of the offense,
Douglas argued that the conduct must do more than cause personal discomfort to
be punishable; rather, it must "menace, disrupt or destroy public order." His con6
duct/speech, he argued, did not rise to this level."
On this issue the Court disagreed with Douglas, declaring, "we cannot imagine
how a student threatening a teacher could not be deemed conduct that tends to
menace, disrupt or destroy public order."11 7 Significantly, the Court specifically
110 Id. at 731.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 The Court noted that the state had to prove two elements: first, that the defendant engaged
in violent, abusive, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or similar disorderly conduct, and second,
that the conduct occurred under circumstances that tended to cause or provoke a disturbance. Id. at
732.
115 Id. at 736.
116 Id. at 737.
117 Id. at 738.
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referred to the climate of school violence as warranting a particularly harsh look
at student threats against other students or faculty.1 18 The Court also noted that
it was not necessary under the statute that the conduct actually cause a disturbance - the conduct only need be the type of conduct that tends to disturb
others."t 9
The Court then looked at whether the story was nevertheless protected by the

First Amendment. Here the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, ruling
that the correct inquiry was not whether or not Douglas's story constituted a
threat or even a direct threat to Mrs. C., but whether it constituted a "true

threat., 120 As the Court noted, a "true threat" is a constitutional term of art used
to describe a specific category of unprotected speech. 12 1 A true threat, according
to the Court, is a statement that, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances,

"a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as

a serious expression of an intent to inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole,
jest, innocuous
talk, expressions of political views or other similarly protected
22
speech. "11
Applying these considerations to Douglas's story, the Court held that in the
context of a creative writing class, the story did not constitute a true threat. The
story was not addressed directly from Douglas to Mrs. C, but rather was written

in the third person; parts of the story contained hyperbole and attempts at humor; the assignment envisioned that another student would actually finish the
story, so Douglas might have anticipated a different ending; and there was no

evidence that Douglas had threatened Mrs. C in the
past or that Mrs. C. believed
1 23
Douglas had a propensity to engage in violence.

Concluding, the Court emphasized that its holding must not be read as limiting
or undermining the school's authority to discipline Douglas, and held specifically

124
that the school had more than enough reason to suspend Douglas for his story.

118 Id., citing Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Barbara J. Brunner, The Right to Write? Free Expression Rights of Pennsylvania's Creative Students
After Columbine, 107 DICK. L. REv. 891, 909-10 (2003).
119 Id. See also State v. Schwebke, 644 N.W.2d 666, 677 (Wis. 2002) (citing Douglas D. for the
proposition that conduct is not punishable under the statute when it tends to cause only personal
annoyance, but also noting that "the disorderly conduct statute does not necessarily require disruptions or disturbances that implicate the public directly").
120 In re Douglas D., at 738-39.
121 Id. at 739 (citing State v. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 2001)).
122 Id. (citing State v. Perkins, 626 N.W. 2d 762 (Wis. 2001)). Specific factors to consider include "how the recipient and other listeners reacted to the alleged threat, whether [the threat] was
conditional, whether the threat was communicated directly to the victim, whether the maker of the
threat had made similar statements to the victim on other occasions, and whether the victim had
reason to believe that the maker of the threat had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a
propensity to engage in violence." 626 N.W. 2d at 740 (citing Perkins).
123 Id. at 740-41.
124 Id. at 743-44.
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The Court articulated a thoughtful balance between legitimate concerns for
school safety and preserving the guarantees of the First Amendment, while simultaneously recognizing the different roles that schools and law enforcement play in
maintaining that balance:
In sum, we reemphasize that we share the public's concern regarding
threats of school violence. Society need not tolerate true threats. Such
speech, even if purely written, can and should be prosecuted under the disorderly conduct statute .... However, we also recognize that "it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse." Thus, although we hold that Douglas' story is not a true threat . . . , we nonetheless believe that the school
properly disciplined Douglas. This case reinforces our belief that while
some student conduct may warrant punishment by both law enforcement
officials and school authorities, school discipline generally should remain
125
the prerogative of our schools, not our juvenile justice system.
Two recent cases from Arizona, involving more traditional allegations of disorderly conduct, expressed similar concerns about the rush to criminalize offensive
behavior in schools, while preserving and acknowledging the school's own authority to impose discipline within the school context.
In re Julio L. 12 6 was an appeal by a fifteen-year-old who was adjudicated delinquent under a provision of Arizona's disorderly conduct statute which prohibited
"fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior." 12 7 At the time of the incident,
Julio was a student in an alternative school for children with behavioral
problems.'12 After Julio spent the morning talking, laughing and giggling during
class, the school's assistant principal was called. She asked Julio to speak with her
outside the classroom. Julio refused to meet with her in the hall, said "F- you"
to her after being asked repeatedly to come out of the classroom, and kicked over
a plastic chair. The chair did not strike anyone, and few students were in the
classroom at the time. 1 29 In addition to being charged with delinquency, Julio was
also suspended. The delinquency adjudication was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 3 ° The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. 31
The Court instantly framed the issue as involving the determination whether
Julio's behavior "crossed the line from a case for school discipline to one for
criminal prosecution."'1 32 Within the context of the disorderly conduct statute, the
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 743 (internal citation omitted).
3 P.3d 383 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc).
Id. at 384 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-2904(A)(1)).
Id. at 384.
Id.
990 P.2d 683 (1999).
3 P.3d 383 (Ariz. 2000).
Id. at 385.
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Court looked at (1) whose peace or quiet was disturbed, and
(2) whether the
13 3
conduct rose to the level of "seriously disruptive behavior."
With respect to the first issue, the Court held that actual proof that the assistant principal's peace was disturbed was required, because she was specifically
named in the petition. The Court rejected the suggestion that it should consider
whether the peace of the school was disrupted, because the incident took place
between classes with few observers, and there was no evidence that any
class or
34
school function was disturbed by Julio's cursing or kicking the chair.'
The fact that the incident took place in an alternative school for youth with
behavioral problems, combined with the assistant principal's experience and role
in meting out discipline in the school, figured prominently in the Court's conclusion that her job functions were not seriously disrupted. As the Court held, "To
135
the contrary, she was performing her duties in dealing with Julio's behavior."
The Court also declined to hold that Julio's conduct rose to the level of "seriously disruptive behavior" as required by the statute. The Court construed "seriously disruptive behavior" to be of the same nature as fighting or violence, or
conduct liable to provoke that response in others and thus to threaten the continuation of some event, function or activity.136 The Court made clear that it did not
condone Julio's behavior, but importantly noted it "must keep in mind the difference between civil and criminal conduct. ' 137 The Court reasoned:
Our laws do not make criminals out of adults or juveniles because they act
offensively or rudely or lack respect and control. The type of conduct in this
case does not become criminal under our current statutes unless it disturbs
the peace of someone by seriously disrupting something. In the present
case, the school administrator was not assaulted, did not feel threatened,
was not provoked to physically retaliate, and did not feel the need to protect herself. The conduct did not impact the normal operation of the
school.

13 8

In responding to the dissent, the majority stressed again the nature of the
school and the administrator's disciplinary role. Handling misbehavior such as
that engaged in by Julio was part of her job. It was therefore unreasonable to
argue that her job performance was interrupted. Moreover, the administrator testified that Julio's behavior was not unusual in the alternative school. 139 The Court
133 Because the juvenile court did not base the adjudication of delinquency on Julio's use of
profanity, the Court did not consider Julio's challenge to the adjudication under the First Amendment. Id. at 384.
134 Id. at 385.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 386.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 387.
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rejected the notion that the criminal law should be "stretched" to punish school
behavioral problems of a type that, "though unfortunately all too common,
neither injure or threaten any person nor seriously disrupt any school class or
function." The Court concluded, "Nor would common sense allow such a method
1 40
of handling childish, impudent, or 'defiant' . . . behavior.
Shortly after Julio L. was decided, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed an
adjudication of delinquency based on allegations of disorderly conduct arising out
of similar school based behavior. In re Paul M. 1 4 1 involved a thirteen-year-old
student in a regular public school, who repeatedly told a teacher's aide to "fuck
off" when the aide tried to intervene in a lunch-time playground situation that
she thought might escalate into a fight. 142 The student was charged under a different provision of the Arizona disorderly conduct statute that proscribed
"abuse" of a school employee.14 3
In reversing the adjudication, the court stressed that because the statute expressly criminalized "abuse" but not "insults" directed at a teacher,1 44 the only
inquiry was whether the minor's repeated use of obscenity could constitute abuse
under the statute. While acknowledging that the words were crude, disrespectful
and wholly inappropriate, the court found the words were not a disparaging or
hurtful attack on the aide personally, and that "abuse" under the statute connotes
"conduct more serious, more purposefully injurious and more potentially harmful
than insulting words or disrespectful behavior." 145 Expressly noting the cautionary words of the state Supreme Court in Julio L., the court wrote:
We find the court's reasoning [in Julio L.] equally applicable to the different
statute at issue here. In the absence of a legislative definition of "abuse,"
we believe the term should be reserved for conduct very different in degree,
if not also in kind, from the minor's vulgar words and defiant actions here.
That the minor's behavior was inappropriate and thoroughly offensive is
beyond dispute, as is the school's unquestioned right to impose such disciplinary consequences as the five-day suspension from school mentioned by
the court. The question before us, however, is whether the brazen impudence and gratuitous vulgarity of a thirteen-year-old constitute abuse under
[the statute]. 4 6
140 Id.
141 7 P.3d 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
142 Id. at 132-33.
143 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-507.
144 Prior to 1989, the statute provided that the offense could be committed by abusing or insulting a teacher. The statute was amended in 1989 to delete insults from the provision. In re Paul M., 7
P.3d at 133.
145 Id. at 134.
146 Id. at 135.
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Because the juvenile court clearly hinged its adjudication on an interpretation
of the statute that included "coarse or insulting" words, the appeals court found it
had gone too far in criminalizing conduct outside the bounds of the statute, and
reversed.147
Finally, two North Carolina cases suggest how seemingly minor school misconduct may be elevated to a more serious, criminal level depending on whether it is
considered in the pre- or post Columbine world. Matter of Eller1 48 is another
example of a school's seeking to criminalize fairly trivial behavior that had little
impact on the classroom environment. Eller and Greer were two high school special education students in Ashe County, North Carolina who were referred to
juvenile court and charged with disorderly conduct for striking a metal radiator in
class two or three times and, in the case of Greer, possessing a carpenter's nail in
class.1 4 9 With respect to Greer's possession of the nail, the incident occurred during the course of a special education reading class that included Greer and four
other students. The teacher observed Greer move toward another student while
she was writing an assignment on the board. The teacher approached Greer and
asked her what was in her hand; Greer showed the teacher the carpenter's nail
and immediately handed it over to her when she asked for it.1 50
The radiator incident occurred approximately one month later and involved
both Greer and Eller, who struck the radiator while seated in the back of a math
class taught by the same teacher, and which included two other students in addition to Greer and Eller. 15' Each time the students struck the radiator, it made a
rattling, metallic noise which caused the other two students to look in the director
of the radiator, and caused the teacher to interrupt her lecture for fifteen or
twenty seconds each time, silently stare at Eller and Greer and then continue
with her lecture. The teacher did nothing more that stare at the students after
each incident, and after two or three times the conduct ceased. 152 The teacher
reported the incidents to the school principal later that day or the following
53
day.'
The students were charged under a provision of the North Carolina disorderly
conduct statute that prohibited and intentional public disturbance that "disrupts,
disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students ... or ...disturbs the peace,
order or discipline at any public or private educational institution ....
In
adjudicating the students delinquent, the juvenile court found that both girls had
147 Id.
148 Matter of Eller, 406 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. App. (1991), rev'd, 417 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. 1992).
149 Matter of Eller, 417 S.E.2d 479, 480-81 (N.C. 1992).
150 Id. at 480.
151 Id. at 480-81.
152 Id. at 481.
153 Id.
154 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (Supp. 1999).
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intentionally caused "an actual and material interference with the program of
educational instruction at the high school." 155 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
adjudication with one dissent. 56
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. The Court found the State had
failed to produce substantial evidence that the students' conduct caused a substantial interference with the teaching. 1 57 As the Court noted, the radiator incident merited no more intervention than a few glares of disapproval by the
teacher.1 58 As for the nail incident, the student willingly and promptly turned
over the nail, and any interruption of class was extremely limited, with the students returning to their work at the teacher's instruction. 159 The Court readily
distinguished Greer and Eller's conduct from other North Carolina cases involving student demonstrations 16 0 and sit-ins"' that plainly caused substantial disruption of the school day and required significant intervention by school teachers
and administrators. The Court also noted the disorderly conduct statute had been
passed in 1969 amid heightened concern about civil unrest in the country, and
that "[t]o say that the relatively modest disturbances caused by respondents 1in
62
the instant case do not rise to this level of concern would appear self-evident.'
More recently, however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed an
adjudication under the same provision of the disorderly conduct statute for conduct that hardly seems significantly more disruptive than Greer and Eller's. In In
re M.G.,163 a student yelled "shut the fuck up" to another group of students in a
hallway of his middle school. 16 4 A physical education teacher approximately
thirty feet away, on his way to lunch duty in the cafeteria, heard the expletive.
The teacher left his position in the cafeteria in order to escort the student to the
school detention center. 165 M.G. was found delinquent by the juvenile court.
155 Id. at 481.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 482.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 State v. Wiggins, 158 S.E.2d 37 (N.C. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1128 (1968) (upholding
conviction of students for violating statute prohibiting disruption of school because their demonstration on behalf of civil rights during school hours caused students left classrooms and moved around
the school to observe the demonstration outside, and the principal had to walk up an down the halls
to get students back to class).
161 State v. Midgett, 174 S.E.2d 124 (N.C. App. 1970) (affirming conviction of twelve students
who occupied the principal's office and defaced furniture, causing school to be dismissed early).
162 Matter of Eller, 417 S.E.2d at 483. See also In re K.F., 2005 WL 14662 (N.C. App. 2005)
(unpublished opinion finding no disorderly conduct caused by student's cursing and speaking loudly
in an administrative hallway where no teacher had to leave his or her post and no classes were disturbed, because there was no substantial interference with normal school operations).
163 In re M.G., 576 S.E.2d 398 (N.C. App. 2003).
164 Id. at 399.
165 Id.
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In affirming the adjudication, the court looked primarily at the fact that a
teacher was temporarily removed from his duties in order to address the student's

conduct, citing a nearly identical 2002 North Carolina case in which a delinquency adjudication was upheld when a teacher left her classroom to escort a
student to the principal's office after the student yelled "fuck you" in the classroom. 16 6

Decided in the post-Columbine era, these two cases unfortunately suggest a lower level of tolerance for student misbehavior than the court in Greer
and Eller was apparently willing to accept.
C. Assault

Increasingly, the schoolyard fight of the past that resulted in little more than a
suspension now leads to a felony charge in juvenile court with consequences that
may follow students in both subsequent delinquency cases as well as in the adult
criminal justice system. Whether used to designate the youth as habitual or violent juvenile offenders for disposition or transfer purposes,167 or to increase

sentences in the adult system, 168 adjudications of delinquency based on felonies
rather than misdemeanors can make a significant difference if the student reoffends. The discussion above looked at ways to challenge delinquency charges of
terroristic threats or disorderly conduct outright. In cases of assault, while defense counsel always should consider opportunities for dismissal of the charges,

strategies to reduce felony charges to misdemeanors, even in juvenile court where
these designations often have little impact in an indeterminate sentencing
scheme, take on added importance.
Over the course of the last twenty years, many states amended their criminal
codes to elevate any assault on a school employee to a felony grade aggravated

assault - whether or not the conduct was intended to cause bodily injury or serious bodily injury. 169 Where the conduct is charged as a felony based on the status
of the victim, not the degree of injury inflicted, the charge will not likely be dis166 Id. at 400 (citing In re Pineault, 566 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. App. 2002), disc. review denied,
570 S.E.2d 728 (2002)). See also In re T.S.B., 2004 WL 1613554, 600 S.E.2d 900 (N.C. App. 2004)
(unpublished opinion upholding finding of disturbance by student who got into a confrontation and
over a span of two hours had interacted with three teachers and caused the police to be called); In re
CCM, 2004 WL 1610093, 600 S.E. 2d 901 (N.C. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion upholding finding
that student who used profanity upon being suspended, requiring the intervention of a teacher and
assistant principal (who stopped their duties as a result) as well as a police officer, "substantially
interfered with the operation of the school" so as to be guilt of disorderly conduct).
167 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 500 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN., § 405/5-140 (West 2006); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4A-44 (West 1987); VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 16.1-330.1 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.160 (West 1993) (cited in Julianne P.
Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation
Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAN. L. REV. 479, 489 (1995)).
168 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2006).
169 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-9 (2006); FL. STAT. ANN. § 784.081 (West 2006); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-1204 (West 2001); 18

PA. CoNs. STAT.

§ 2702(a)(5) (West 2006).

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

missed or reduced to a misdemeanor unless the proof is questionable or the court
is persuaded to exercise its inherent discretion to divert cases in the best interests
of the youth. Where the incident involves conduct between or among students,
however, or a school employee, such as an aide, who may not be included in the
statute's reach, holding the state to its proof on each element of the offense could
lead to a reduction of the charge.
In re Shafer170 is an example of a felony assault charge being reduced to a
misdemeanor where the victim, an educational assistant, was deemed outside the
scope of an Ohio statute's proscription of assaults against " school teachers, administrators, or school bus operators" on school property, and designating such
assaults fifth degree felonies. 17 1 At the time of the incident, Shafer was a twelveyear-old student in a school for severely handicapped youth. 172 Shafer was in
gym class with other students and Ms. Jackson, an educational assistant or
"teacher's aide." 173 After Shafer approached another student with a pen and repeatedly threatened to kill the other student, Ms. Jackson intervened and asked
Shafer to give her the pen. 1 74 Instead, Shafer spit on Jackson's arm, and then
accidentally threw the pen at Jackson while trying to throw it at the other student.17 5 As the other student was walking away, Shafer bit Jackson on her arm.' 7 6
Shafer was charged in juvenile court under the statutory provision cited above
and adjudicated delinquent. 177 On appeal, Shafer argued that a teacher's aide did
not qualify as a "school teacher" under the statute. 178 The Ohio Court of Appeals
agreed, noting that a school teacher and teacher's aide are licensed pursuant to
different provisions of the Ohio Code and that the assault provision clearly limited the definition of school teacher to a person licensed in accordance with the
teacher's, but not teacher's aide, provisions.1 79 While the court found the exclusion of teacher's aides from the statute unreasonable, the court nevertheless felt
constrained to apply the "plain unambiguous language, 180 of the statute as written by the legislature. On remand to the juvenile court, the court added that
although Shafer could not be adjudicated under the felony assault statue, his conduct as found by the juvenile court "certainly amount[ed] to an assault that.., is
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

761 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(C)(2)(e); (C)(5); (C)(6) (West 2000).
761 N.E.2d at 1096.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
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court it would be
a misdemeanor of the first degree," and advised the juvenile
181
justified in adjudicating Shafer delinquent on that basis.
The degree of bodily injury inflicted, as well as the intent of the accused, is
central to the grade of the offense where the status of the victim is not an issue and regardless of whether the incident was school-based. Here, it is important to
review the case law in any particular jurisdiction to determine how the courts
have interpreted the statutory elements for simple, as compared to aggravated,
assault. In Pennsylvania, for example, a charge of aggravated assault will not be
sustained if there is insufficient evidence of intent to cause serious bodily injury.
In Commonwealth v. Roche,1 82 the defendant appealed a conviction of aggravated assault stemming from his punching the victim in the eye with his closed
fist, causing the victim to fall to the ground and lose consciousness.1 83 The victim's head struck concrete when he fell, which also caused a scalp laceration that
bled profusely. Ultimately, the victim spent five days in the hospital, had surgery
performed on his eye, and received eight staples to close the wound on his
head.' 8 4 On appeal, the defendant argued that although the victim did suffer serious bodily injury, the statute also requires the state to show that defendant acted
with the intent to cause serious bodily injury, and that a weaponless punch to the
victim's head did not establish the requisite intent. 185 The appeals court agreed.
The court wrote:
Simply showing that the victim sustained a serious bodily injury is not
enough to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault. The aggravated assault statute is not a strict liability statute . . . [T]he Commonwealth must
also prove that the Appellant acted with the requisite ... criminal state of
mind.18 6

181

Id. at 1099.

182 783 A.2d 766 (Pa. Super. 2001).
183 Id. at 767.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 768.
186 Id. at 770. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gruff, 822 A. 2d 773 (Pa. Super. 2002) (finding, in an
assault case involving a rifle with a bayonet but where no harm was actually done, defendant guilty of
assault after finding an intent to "seriously injure" based on the use of a deadly weapon, placing the
weapon against the victim's throat, and expressly threatening to kill the victim); Commonwealth v.
Dailey, 828 A. 2d 356 (Pa. Super. 2003) (finding defendant attempted "to inflict serious bodily injury"
in twice punching victim, who seemed dazed and helpless, as defendant moved toward victim in an
aggressive manner to deliver another punch when defendant was forcibly restrained).
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III.

THE DEFENSES OF INFANCY AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED

By

ALSO

DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTING YOUTH

WITH SPECIAL EDUCATION NEEDS

The infancy defense presumes a child, because of her age, cannot appreciate
the wrongfulness of her conduct. The common law doctrine recognized that while
a child may have actually intended to perform a criminal act, children in general
could not reasonably be presumed capable of differentiating right from wrong.
The presumption of incapacity was created to avoid punishing those who, because of age, could not appreciate the moral dimensions of their behavior, and
for whom the threat of punishment would not act as a deterrent. 187 Under the
doctrine of diminished capacity, a child may actually commit a delinquent act, but
her mental or emotional condition would preclude liability because she was not
able to form the requisite intent. Both infancy and diminished capacity are additional useful tools for defense attorneys when representing children with special
education needs who act out in school, either as a manifestation of their disability, or because they do not understand the wrongfulness of their actions.
The defense of infancy was created to protect children from retribution in recognition of their inability to differentiate right from wrong. This defense has had
little success in most reported decisions. For example, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that infancy is irrelevant to a determination of delinquency under
Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act. 88 The Court held that to permit the infancy defense
in proceedings under the Act would operate to remove some juveniles from both
the adult and the juvenile systems, and prevent the child from receiving the care
and rehabilitation that the legislature deemed appropriate. The Court reasoned
that the Pennsylvania legislature, by defining a "delinquent child" to be "[a] child
ten years of age or older whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act,"' 18 9 has established conclusively that children aged ten years and older
have the capacity to commit delinquent acts, thereby abrogating any common law
190
considerations to the contrary.
Other states, however, have codified the infancy defense, asserting that it is the
responsibility of the law to protect from the criminal justice system those individuals of tender years who are less capable than adults of appreciating the wrongfulness of their behavior. 1 91 In order to overcome the presumption of incapacity
implicit in the infancy defense, the State must provide clear and convincing evidence that the child had sufficient capacity to understand the act and to know
187 In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989).
188 In the Interest of G.T., 597 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Super 1991).
189 42 PA.C.S. § 6302 (emphasis added).
190 597 A.2d at 642.
191 State v. Ramer, 86 P.2d 132, 136 (Wash. 2004) quoting State v. O.D., 685 P.2d 557, 557
(Wash. 1984); In re Raymond J., 715 N.E.2d 486 (N.Y. 1999).
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that it was wrong.' 9 2 Defense counsel must use this burden to their advantage,
combining principles of infancy and diminished capacity. A capacity determination is fact-specific and must be in reference to the specific act charged.1 93 It is
not necessary, however, for the child to understand that the act would be punishable under the law.1 9 4 The focus is on "whether the child appreciated the quality
of his or her acts at the time the act was committed," rather than whether the
child understood the legal consequences of the act. 195
Additionally, diminished capacity may be invoked to negate specific intent,
where such intent is an element of the offense charged. A child accused of committing a delinquent act in the school context may also proffer evidence of diminished capacity by offering evidence of his mental condition with respect to his
ability to have the requisite mens rea or intent for the offense charged. Courts
have recognized the doctrine of diminished capacity, holding that where evidence
of an abnormal mental condition tends to prove either that the accused did not or
could not form the intent essential to the offense, such evidence, while insufficient to establish a defense of insanity, should be considered for purposes of determining whether the crime charged, or a lesser degree of the crime charged,
was committed.196 Most courts have held that the diminished capacity defense is
only available on a first-degree murder charge, but no court has expressly ruled
out the use of a diminished capacity defense to any charge requiring specific
intent.
An accused offering evidence under a theory of diminished capacity concedes
liability, but asserts his lack of capacity to possess the particular state of mind
required by the alleged crime. Although some courts have been reluctant to extend the defense of diminished capacity to juvenile matters, no court has explicitly ruled on the admission of such evidence. 197 The thrust of the diminished
capacity doctrine relates to the accused's ability to perform a specified cognitive
process. 198 Although this connotes partial responsibility, in fact, the juvenile is
192 State v. J.P.S., 954 P.2d 894 (Wash. 1989); Q.D., 685 P.2d at 557.
193 J.P.S., 954 P.2d at 894; Q.D., 685 P.2d at 557.
194 J.P.S., 954 P.2d at 894; Q.D., 685 P.2d at 557.
195 State v. T.E.H., 960 P.2d 441 (Wash. App. 1998).
196 The Court in D.A.S. rejected D.A.S.'s argument of diminished capacity, viewing D.A.S.'s
argument as directed more to his capacity to understand and control his actions than his intent to
commit the offenses charged. D.A.S. offered evidence of his disability's impact on his ability to understand and appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. He also argued that the profferd evidence
would show that he was unable to control his actions. The Court held, however, that this did not
demonstrate that he lacked the necessary intent to commit the acts. The Court specifically distinguished between a mens rea argument and the diminished capacity argument D.A.S. set forth. The
opinion suggests that the Court would have been open to an argument on mens rea if D.A.S. had
demonstrated his disability impacted his capacity to form the specific intent necessary to be held
responsible. See In the Interest of D.A.S. at 6, 8.
197 D.A.S., No. 668 MDA 2005, slip op.
198 Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 215 (1976).
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still fully responsible for the conduct, but only for an act which does not require
the elements of premeditation and deliberation.' 99 Asserting a diminished capacity defense allows proof of mental disability short of insanity as evidence of lack
of deliberate or premeditated design. 200 The diminished responsibility defense

permits proof of a juvenile's mental condition on the issue of capacity to form a
specific intent in those instances in which the State must prove a defendant's
specific intent as an element of the crime charged.2 ° 1 When a child commits a
delinquent act in school, he may be able to assert diminished capacity, in addition
20 2
to the manifestation defense.

When asserting the defense of diminished capacity, as in the manifestation defense, expert psychiatric testimony may provide relevant information about the
effect of the child's disability on his behavior at school.20 3 Psychiatric testimony
has long been admissible in criminal court to determine the accused's competency to stand trial, his state of mind at the time of the offense, his ability to make

a detailed written confession, and as a mitigating factor in the penalty stage of
trial.20 4 In mounting the defense of diminished capacity, the defendant may introduce psychiatric testimony that addresses mental disorders affecting his or her

cognitive functions, so long as these functions impede his ability to deliberate and
premeditate as necessary in the crime of first-degree murder. Psychiatric testimony is competent in Pennsylvania on the issue of specific intent to kill if it
speaks to mental disorders affecting the cognitive functions necessary to formulate a specific intent. Where it does not, it is irrelevant, and therefore
inadmissible.20 5

199 Id.
200 Id. (quoting State of New Mexico v. Padilla, 347 P.2d 312, 314 (N.M. 1959)).
201 Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 684; McVey, 376 N.W.2d at 586.
202 In A.M.H., the court did not reject outright the relevance or appropriateness of A.M.H.'s
diminished capacity defense. The court did not consider it because the Manifestation Determination
and IEP did not provide a diagnosis of disability that would prove A.M.H. had diminished capacity to
act with the necessary intent. Similar to D.A.S., A.M.H.'s adjudication was upheld because the court
did not see a specific connection between his diminished capacity argument and the intent necessary
to be responsible for his actions. Both of these cases suggest that, under the appropriate circumstances a child suffering from a particular disability may assert a diminished capacity defense, asserting that he lacks the capacity to form the stated intent required by statute and to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions. See In the Interest of A.M.H., No. 479 EDA 2005, slip op. (Pa. Super.
May 18, 2005).
203 A child with special education needs may also assert the defense of voluntariness and offer
expert testimony to explain how his inability to control his actions would affect his behavior and cause
involuntary conduct. See Commonwealth v. Fierst, 620 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. 1993).
204 Walzack, 428 Pa. at 220.
205 Commonwealth v. Garcia, 505 Pa. 304, 310 (1984).
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IV.

JUDGES WHO ADJUDICATE YOUTH DELINQUENT SHOULD SEEK TO

AvoID

UNNECESSARY PLACEMENT

Many school referrals are appropriate. Sometimes youth are repeat offenders
or are already on probation, or the offense is serious. And most adjudications of
delinquency are supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, when a juvenile court
adjudicates a youth delinquent on a new charge, it must still consider whether
placement outside the home is appropriate, and, if so, whether such placement is
the least restrictive alternative. In making a disposition decision, the juvenile
court will conduct its normal balancing of interests. These include considerations
of public safety as well as the needs of the youth.
When services are unavailable in the community, judges are more likely to
place a child in substitute care after an adjudication of delinquency.2 0 6 Defense
counsel will argue that services are available in the community, i.e., in public
schools. All the court has to do, the defense will say, is order schools to provide
them.
There is scant literature on the authority of juvenile court judges to order a
school district to provide an appropriate education for a non-incarcerated youth,
when the school district has expelled the youth from school. There is a recent
case in New Jersey, however, in which the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction
over the state sufficient to order the state to provide such youth with a public
20 7
school education.
G.S, a basic education student, was expelled from school for a false bomb
threat. He was also arrested, but the school district did not seek incarceration,
and the juvenile court judge noted that G.S. was a first-time offender with a decent academic record. G.S. did not challenge his expulsion, but argued in juvenile
court that the New Jersey Constitution required the state to provide him with a
public education in an alternative program or setting. The school district argued
that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over it. In a case of first impression, the
juvenile court disagreed.
The issue here does not implicate the propriety of [the expulsion decision]
.... Rather, the substantive issues presented here are whether, given the
expulsion from school of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent, he nonetheless
is entitled to further public school education under the Constitution or statutes of New Jersey, and if so, whether the Family Part may order the State
206

See

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N

No. GAO-03-397,

CHILD WELFARE AND JU-

VENILE JUSTICE: FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A STRONGER ROLE IN HELPING STATES REDUCE

38 (2003) (concluding the juvenile justice and child welfare systems become repositories for youth with mental
health problems because community-based mental health systems are inadequate and parents do not
have the resources to obtain mental health services on their own).
207 State ex rel. G.S., 330 N.J. Super. 383, 749 A.2d 902 (2000).
THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PLACED SOLELY TO OBTAIN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

to provide such education. This in turn raises the initial question ...
subject-matter jurisdiction ... 208

[of]

The court examined the language of the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice
and the state Constitution. Together, the court held, the Code and the Constitution gave the court authority to order education for youth under its supervision.
The court directed the state to provide an alternative school program.
CONCLUSION

For most of the last decade, school districts have controlled the narrative of
cases that they refer to juvenile court. Their story line has had "violence prevention" as its headline, and its text has relied on traditional criminal law principles
of culpability, deterrence, and incapacitation.
We suggest that during the course of case processing, there are three opportunities for defense counsel to change the narrative. Each opportunity requires defense counsel to present to the juvenile court a compelling reason to reject the
schools' characterization of students who are charged with crimes.
The first opportunity comes before adjudication of delinquency, when defense
counsel may ask for pre-trial diversion or dismissal of the charges after the prosecutor presents a case. The second opportunity is more technical and requires the
court to adopt the defense view of the elements of the offense. The third opportunity turns again to the court's broader discretion, this time when it enters an
order of disposition. Here, defense counsel may seek a community-based
disposition.
These opportunities are cumulative. Each will influence the decision that follows. A court that rejects diversion might later find the student delinquent on a
lesser charge; a court that rejects a lesser charge might nevertheless leave the
student in the home. For these reasons, defense counsel must relentlessly pursue
each option through the course of any case in which prosecution is arguably unreasonable. At some point in the process, courts listen to voices of reason.

208

G.S., 330 N.J. Super. at 388-89, 749 A.2d at 904.

